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Efforts undertaken by France to restructure the allocation of governmental competencies increased the 
importance  of  subnational  governments  by  transferring  additional  tasks.  This  paper  analyzes  the 
efficiency of public spending on an intermediate government level for a sample of 96 départements in 
metropolitan  France  in  2008.  Spending  efficiency  is  measured  using  Data  Envelopment  Analysis 
(DEA).  Results  indicate  significant  room  for  improvements  and  detect  spending  inefficiencies 
averaging between 10 and 22 percent, depending on model specification. To explain efficiency, a 
bootstrapped truncated regression, following Simar and Wilson (2007), is applied. The second-stage 
regression shows that efficiency is also determined by exogenous factors and identifies the distance to 
the national capital, inhabitants’ income and the share of inhabitants of an age over 65 as significant 
determinants of efficiency. 
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1  Introduction 
In the course of the financial crisis starting in 2007, the sustainability of public finances was again put 
on the public agenda. However, the increasing pressure on public budgets is not new but is more 
pronounced and manifold than before.
2 The OECD (2010a) emphasizes the strong need for fiscal 
consolidation,  whereby  structural  reforms  remain  an  essential  policy  tool  for  its  facilitation. 
Particularly those reforms targeting the increase in public sectors’ productivity and efficiency would 
improve the fiscal positions of many countries (OECD, 2010a). Efficiency improvement potentials do 
not seem to be fully exploited, most notably at the sub-national government level (OECD, 2007, 
2009a). Using 2008 data on the 96 European French départements, this paper evaluates the spending 
efficiency of this intermediate level of governance using non-parametric efficiency analysis. Further, it 
aims to discuss factors that might explain parts of the existing inefficiency by second-stage regression. 
In general, the public sector comprises of those economic activities in which governments are engaged 
either in the production, the delivery or the allocation of public goods and services. These activities 
range from providing a legal system to purchasing goods and services, from government production to 
government redistribution of income. How public sector activities are pursued and its scope strongly 
differs among economies (Stiglitz, 2000). In many countries the public sector includes more than one 
level  of  government  (Atkins  and  van  den  Noord,  2001)  and  notably  contributes to  the  economic 
outcome. In 2008, the average share of general government expenditures
3 in gross domestic product 
(GDP) was about 41 % (OECD, 2010b) for OECD countries, emphasizing its economic relevance. 
Particularly in multilayer systems, two issues are relevant for fiscal sustainability and public sector 
performance: the allocation of responsibilities and the management of public spending (OECD, 2003). 
With respect to the former, Atkins and van den Noord (2001) note that decision-making authority is 
preferable where it can best be exercised.
4 With respect to the latter, exercising control over public 
spending is an important instrument strengthening the management of public spending (OECD, 2003, 
2010a). 
Benchmarking is the systematic comparison of the performance of one unit to other units (Bogetoft 
and Otto, 2011), thus making status quo evaluation and identification of areas that can be improved 
possible.  Thus,  it  is  a  tool  to  exercise  control  over  public  expenditures,  independently  from  the 
contributing level of government. Efficiency analysis provides benchmarking approaches that identify 
best practices (frontier) used in the transformation of inputs to outputs (technology). Relative to the 
determined best practice, unit-individual inefficiency then can be measured.
5 To define the frontier and 
                                                 
2  The  European  Commission  (2010,  p.  66)  mentions  the  falling  share  of  working  age  people  in  the  population,  lower 
(potential) economic growth and higher costs associated with providing services for the aging population. 
3 These include expenditures by central, state and local government plus social security. 
4 This argumentation is in line with public choice theory (effectiveness and knowledge about needs), e.g. Mueller (2003), 
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010). 
5 It is common consensus that the public sector production exhibits inefficiencies that arise from numerous sources, e.g., 
organizational settings and personnel, procurement and budgeting restrictions. Therefore, the private sector serves as the 
standard of comparison. Alternatively, inefficiencies can be identified by comparing economic  activities of  government 
bodies among a homogenous group.   3 
measure the inefficiency of French départements we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is 
a  deterministic  and  nonparametric  benchmarking  method.
6  Compared  to  alternative  parametric 
techniques, e.g., Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), one distinguishing feature of DEA is that, except 
for convexity, it does not require any assumptions, such as a functional form, regarding the technology 
(Hjalmarsson et al., 1996). This is very useful since governmental activity, opposed to the example of 
firm  activity,  does  not  have  a  convenient,  well-established  equivalence  in  microeconomic  theory. 
Thus,  governmental  behavior  might  not  be  adequately  represented  by  a  production  function. 
Furthermore, DEA allows us to consider multiple outputs, representing different governmental duties. 
Efficiency analysis is applied to numerous European countries, and although France is one of the 
biggest  economies  in  the  world  and  an  important  member  of  the  European  Union  (EU),  to  our 
knowledge, it has not been individually studied.
7 In addition, such an analysis is worthwhile because 
the repeated failure of authorities to meet medium-term spending objectives reinforces the need to 
improve the capacity of decision makers to control public spending (OECD, 2003). 
France possesses a unique organization of its public sector, which roughly consists of the central 
government,  the  sub-national  governments,  the  social  security  funds,  and  large  publicly  owned 
enterprises (OECD, 2003). The country is a decentralized, unitary state meaning that the central state 
holds all legislative power and delegates responsibilities for public service provision to sub-national 
administrative bodies. According to OECD (2010b), the overall proportion of general government 
expenditures
8 to national GDP in France is the highest ratio among the OECD countries, about 53 % in 
2008. These expenditures include those made by the central government (about 34 %), by the sub-
national governments (about 21 %), and by the social security (about 45 %; OECD, 2009b). 
The  French  Constitution  entitles  three  levels  of  sub-national  governments:  the  régions,  the 
départements,  and  the  communes;  each  with  an  elected  council,  autonomously  financed,  and 
possessing - to a limited extent - fiscal sovereignty (French Constitution, Art. 72, 72-2). While the 
régions contribute with 13 % to local governments’ expenditures, the secteur communal
9 contributes 
with 55 % and the départements with 32 % (CLENCH, 2010). 
We are particularly interested in analyzing départements for two reasons: First, they constitute the 
intermediate level of sub-national government for which a lack of analysis still exists and the potential 
for efficiency improvement does not seem to be exploited at this level yet. Second, départements hold 
an important role in the shifting of power from national to local authorities. France has a long history 
of decentralization, which can be interpreted as part of a broader effort by the French state to deal with 
the increasing complexity of its responsibilities and  management (Cole, 2006). The power of the 
départements was already enhanced with the reforms of 1982-1983 that conceded larger budgets, more 
                                                 
6 For a comparison and discussion of alternative efficiency analysis methods, see, among others, Coelli et al. (2005), and 
Hjalmarsson et al. (1996). 
7 France is included in cross-country analyses considering OECD countries, e.g., Afonso et al. (2005) and Maudos et al. 
(2003). 
8 This excludes expenditures contributed by the large publicly owned enterprises. 
9 The communal sector includes communes and groupements.    4 
staff and more service-delivery responsibilities. The reforms of 2003-2004 intending to clarify the 
responsibilities shifted additional power toward sub-national levels to support better and more efficient 
governance. As a result the share of general government services delivered by them increased. 
However, inefficiency can be influenced by factors over which the départements cannot fully exercise 
control. Thus, such exogenous factors explain some aspects of the inefficiency. Depending on the 
considered system, these variables can relate to, e.g., political, geographical or fiscal characteristics. 
The physical location of Paris, both as a leading global economic center and as the center of French 
political  power,  is  important.  Départements  that  are  part  of  or  are  located  closer  to  the  Paris 
agglomeration may benefit from that location; whether due to the close proximity to policy makers, 
due to a pool of highly skilled labor force, and/or due to economic strength. In addition to other 
factors, this effect needs to be taken into account when discussing spending efficiency. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the literature on public sector 
efficiency.  Section  3  introduces the  methodologies applied in  this  paper.  In  section  4,  the  model 
specifications and data are presented. The results are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Literature Review 
A broad literature on measuring public sector performance by means of frontier methods has evolved. 
Kalb (2010), Afonso and Fernandes (2008), De Borger and Kerstens (2000) and Worthington and 
Dollery  (2000)  provide  comprehensive  overviews  of  the  empirical  evidence  derived  from  both, 
parametric and nonparametric methodologies. The existing literature concentrates on evaluating the 
performance  of  the  public  sector  either  in  terms  of  publicly  proved  services  or  in  terms  of 
administrative units. For example, the work by Hauner and Kyobe (2010), Worthington (1999) and 
Gorman and Ruggiero (2008) all refer to particular services including the health sector, education, 
libraries and police work. However, our focus is on the performance of administrative units. Within 
this context, spending efficiency is understood to be a global measure of the administrative bodies’ 
capability to provide and manage the tasks they are in charge of, with respect to the multiple inputs 
placed at their disposal.
10 
Concerning  the  representation  of inputs,  mainly  financial rather  than  physical  measures are  used. 
While some authors, including this paper, Geys and Moesen (2009), de Sousa and Stosic (2005), 
Vanden Eeckhaut et al. (1993) and Arcelus et al. (2007), use one financial aggregate to describe the 
inputs,  i.e.  total  or  current  expenditures,  others  further  decompose  these  into  capital  related 
expenditures and labor cost (e.g. Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010) or FTE equivalents (Worthington, 2000). 
The advantage of using financial data is that all inputs are considered. However, it also implies that the 
administrative  units  face  identical  input  factor  prices  if  input  factor  prices  and  quantities  cannot 
                                                 
10 This approach is along the same lines as Stiglitz (2000) who refers to the governmental management as a public good itself 
where everybody benefits from a better, more efficient and responsive management.   5 
accordingly be implemented in the estimation. Concerning the representation of outputs, i.e. the goods 
and services administrative units are providing, analyses predominantly rely on the tasks that are 
obligatory to the units due to the legal prescription. Although this approach excludes voluntary tasks, 
depending on the application, it covers the vast majority of costs and, thus, allows comparing the units. 
To measure these outputs, the literature provides a wide range of means. For example, educational 
service is measured as the number of lessons taught (Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2006), pupils enrolled 
(Geys et al., 2010), pupil exam performance (Giordano and Tommasino, 2011), the number of schools, 
or even the population in the relevant age group (Kriese, 2008). Each measure contains information on 
education in general, but delivers different specific information. Following Bradford et al. (1969, p. 
186), one could distinguish direct (D-) outputs, and outputs of primary interest to the citizen-consumer 
(C-output). For instance, while the number of lessons taught tries to assess directly the actual service 
provided, student exam attainment is an outcome that is also a result of other socio-economic factors, 
which are not under control of the local government. However, citizens may be more concerned about 
the final outcome, rather than the amount of services delivered (Afonso and Fernandes, 2006). The 
ongoing discussion on defining inputs and outputs underlines the general problems associated with 
representing the transformation process of administrative units. Among others, Balaguer-Coll et al. 
(2007)  point  out  that  the  production  process  is  complex  and  difficult  to  model  and  Afonso  and 
Fernandes (2006) note that inputs and outputs are difficult to model. Furthermore, prices are hardly 
available (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).  
With respect to the character of administrative units, efficiency analyses are conducted at the different 
tiers  of  governmental  organization.  The  country  level,  i.e.  state  level,  is  the  level  of  highest 
aggregation.  Work  by  Afonso  et  al.  (2005),  provides  empirical  evidence  for  cross-country 
comparisons. Much attention is on local governments for which tasks can be identified more precisely. 
Municipalities are analyzed for various countries, e.g., Belgium (e.g. Vanden Eeckhaut et al., 1993; De 
Borger et al., 1994), Spain (e.g. Benito et al., 2008; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2010), Germany (e.g. Kriese, 
2008; Kalb, 2010), Japan (Tanaka, 2006), and Finland (Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2006, Loikkanen et 
al., 2011). However, the empirical evidence for intermediate levels of government – to which the 
French départements belong to – is very limited. By nonparametric deterministic techniques, Hauner 
(2008) analyzes the spending efficiency for 89 Russian regions in terms of health care provision, 
education  and  social  services.  The  author  finds  significant  differences  between  the  regions  in  all 
sectors. Likewise, Giordano and Tommasino (2011) find efficiency differences among the 103 Italian 
provinces that perform municipal, regional and national tasks. In addition, the authors identify rather 
low  correlation  of  efficiency  scores  for  different  responsibilities.  Applying  a  stochastic  frontier 
approach, Kellermann (2007) evaluates the spending efficiency of the 26 Swiss Cantons between 1990 
and 2002, finding fairly low inefficiency and increasing efficiencies over time. 
   6 
Subsequent  to  the  measurement  of  the  performance  rendered  by  particular  public  services  and 
administrative units, the literature is also concerned with explaining (in)efficiency. The purpose of 
these analyses is to explain performance differences that are due to exogenous factors (determinants) 
that are not (fully) under the control of the decision-making units. Following Fried et al. (1999), a 
clearer understanding of the nature of inefficiency is important for designing policies that improve 
resource allocation. Such analyses are commonly conducted in a second stage, in which a set of 
explanatory  factors  are  regressed  on  efficiency  scores  obtained  by  efficiency  analysis  techniques. 
Table 1gives an overview on second-stage analysis, outlines the approaches used, and summarizes the 
main findings. 
The determinants can be contextually grouped into political, geographic, fiscal, and socio-economic 
factors. However, Table 1 shows that for some of them the evidence is inconsistent, e.g. population. 
While De Borger et al. (1994), Giménez and Prior (2007), and Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) find a 
positive  impact  of  population  on  efficiency,  the  results  of  Loikkanen  and  Susiluoto  (2006)  and 
Loikkanen et al. (2011) indicate a negative relationship between these factors. Similarly, population 
density is found to be positively related to efficiency in some studies (Geys et al., 2010; Loikkanen 
and Susiluoto, 2006), while other studies do not find significant effects (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008). 
Likewise, the results are ambiguous regarding the influence of inhabitants’ economic situation (e.g. in 
terms of income or purchasing power): while some studies find significant negative impact (De Borger 
and Kerstens, 1996; Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2006), other authors find significant positive influence 
(Giménez  and  Prior,  2007;  Afonso  and  Fernandes,  2008).  Concerning  dependence  on  central 
government transfers, most studies find a negative relationship between central government grants and 
efficiency (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). Similarly, a majority of studies 
find  a  negative  impact  of  tourism  and  in-commuting  on  efficiency,  which  might  be  due  to  the 
additional costs of public goods provided to non-residents. In contrast, increasing urbanization and 
commercial activity (Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 2006; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2002; Giménez and Prior, 
2007) and higher resident education levels (De Borger and Kerstens, 1994, Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 
2006) are generally found to be positively related to efficiency. The latter are also used as indicator for 
citizen political participation, which is also found to positively influence efficiency (e.g. De Borger 
and Kerstens, 2000; Giordano and Tommasino, 2011). 
   7 
Table 1: Overview of Second-stage Analyses on Government Efficiency
11 
Main Finding 
Authors  Sample  Method 
Positive Impact on 
Efficiency 
Negative Impact on 
Efficiency 




Tobit  ·  High local tax rates 
·  Inhabitants education 
level 
·  Higher inhabitants 
income 
·  Per capita block grants 
·  Number of coalition 
parties 




Tobit  ·  Higher property taxes 
·  Inhabitants education 
level 
 
·  Block grants 






Tobit  ·  High share of fees and 
charges in municipal 
income 
·  High investment share in 
total expenditures 
·  Population density 
·  Grants 






Tobit  ·  Largest populations 
·  Level of commercial 
activity 
·  Higher per capita tax 
revenue 
·  Higher per capita grants 
Loikkanen and 




1994 – 2002  
OLS  ·  Higher inhabitants 
education 
·  Dense urban structure 
·  Large share of municipal 
workers between 30 and 
49 
·  Larger population 
·  High inhabitants income 
·  Peripheral location 
·  Diverse service structure 








·  Larger population  ·  Tax revenues 
·  Self-generated revenues 
·  Deficit 
·  Grants 




Tobit  ·  Larger population 
·  Inhabitants income 
·  Commercial activity 
·  Tourism 






Tobit  ·  Inhabitants education 
·  Inhabitants purchasing 
power 
 




·  Inhabitants income 
·  Good governance 
·  Democratic control 
·  Federal grants 
·  Higher spending 




1994 – 2002 
OLS  ·  Dense urban structures 
·  Higher inhabitants 
education 
·  Large share of municipal 
workers between 30 and 
49 
·  City managers’ 
education 
·  Co-operation 
·  High unemployment 
·  Larger population 
·  Peripherality 
                                                 
11 This extends the overview in Afonso and Fernandes (2008).   8 
Second-stage  analysis  predominantly  employs  regression  techniques  such  as  OLS  and  Tobit 
regression. While Tobit regression accounts for the limitation of efficiency scores at unity, it still 
imposes strong statistical assumptions and requires a correct model specification. Simar and Wilson 
(2007) show that this technique has several drawbacks and may lead to biased results. Recent analyses 
of government efficiency take this, to some extent, into account: Hauner (2008) uses a truncated rather 
than a censored regression model following the suggestion of Simar and Wilson (2007). Balaguer-Coll 
et al. (2007) try to overcome the problems with a nonparametric smoothing approach, which demands 
no functional specification and avoids assumption violations. This paper uses bootstrapped truncated 
regression, as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007), which has, to the authors’ knowledge, so far not 
been applied to analyze government efficiency. 
 
 
3  Methodology 
3.1   Performance Measurement with Data Envelopment Analysis 
We  use  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA)  to  measure  the  spending  efficiency  of  French 
départements.  Thereby,  the  départements  can  be  considered  as  decision-making  units  (DMUs) 
transforming inputs to outputs. DEA determines the best practice technology (frontier) by piecewise 
linear programming whereby the frontier envelopes all observed input-output combinations. Thus, the 
frontier sets the benchmark against which each of the départements is compared to and any distance to 
the frontier is interpreted as inefficiency. Those départements lying on the frontier are considered to be 
relatively efficient and serve as peers for others. Hence, a département is fully efficient on the basis of 
available evidence if and only if the performance of other départements does not show that some of its 
inputs or outputs can be improved without worsening some of its other inputs or outputs (Cooper et 
al., 2004, p. 3). More formally, we analyze a set of  ( 1,..., ) I i I = départements that transform an input 
vector i x collecting  ( 1,..., ) n n N =   inputs,  into  an  output  vector  i y   collecting  ( 1,..., ) m m M =  
outputs. According to Simar and Wilson (2008), the production set y  can be understood as the set of 
physical available points( , ) x y , or in other words as a set of feasible input-output combinations, i.e. 
 
( ) { } ,
N M x y x can produce y y e
+
+ = ℝ   (1) 
 
This production set constraints the production process. To describe the efficient boundary (frontier) of 
y  we assume input-orientation meaning that we identify the minimum amount of inputs required to 
produce a given amount of outputs. Hence, for every département, we obtain the maximum potential 
reduction of inputs for its observed level of outputs, which is available in the feasible production set.   9 
This  is  a  reasonable  assumption  because  the  obligatory  tasks  of  the  French  départements  are 
determined  by  law  and  thus,  choices  related  to  outputs  are  limited.  Furthermore,  practical 
consolidation favors spending-based budget retrenchment (OECD, 2010) for which the input-oriented 
boundary  of  y   provides  useful  information.  For  a  départementi  with  the  input-output 
combination
0 0 ( , ) x y , the input-oriented efficiency measure q  is then defined by 
 
( )
0 0 0 0 , min{ ( , ) } x y x y q q q y = Î   (2) 
 
where 
0 0 ( , ) x y q gives  the  radial,  i.e.  proportional,  reduction  of  inputs  a  unit  could  undertake  to 
become efficient (Simar and Wilson, 2008). By construction, q  is equal or less than unity, but cannot 
take values smaller than zero. For 1 q = , the département is efficient and cannot reduce its input. For 
1 q < , the département can produce the same level of output with only using 1 q -  times its input; 
thus it could save q  percent of each input. 
Based on the ideas of Farrell (1957), different linear programs have been developed to allow the 
technology, i.e. the frontier, to be of certain nature. Most frequently, the models proposed by Charnes 
et al. (1978) and Banker et al. (1984) are applied where the technology exhibits constant returns to 
scale (CCR model) and variable returns to scale (BCC  model), respectively. We assume variable 
returns to scale (VRS), which assures that local governments are benchmarked against units of similar 
structure. An efficiency estimate  ɵ q  for an observation operating at level 
0 0 ( , ) x y is then derived by 
solving the following program 
 
ɵ 0 0 0 0
1 1 1
( , ) min ; ; 0; 1, 0; 1,...,
I I I
i i i i i i
i i i
x y y y x x i I q q l q l q l l
= = =
 
= £ ³ > = ³ =  
  ∑ ∑ ∑   (3) 
 
with  i l  being a vector of unit-individual weights for inputs and outputs that are used to construct the 








= ∑ . 
Nonparametric deterministic frontiers, such as those constructed by DEA, are appealing since they rely 
on only few assumptions. However, when applying DEA, particularly two aspects must be carefully 
considered: the convergence rate of the DEA estimator and extreme values or outliers in the data. The 
convergence rate measures how fast an estimator converges to the true and unknown parameter subject 
to the number of observations. Compared to alternative parametric approaches, the DEA estimator 
exhibits a slow degree of convergence. Hence, the validity of DEA estimates strongly depends on the 
number  of  variables  used,  i.e.  the  dimensionality  of  the  model  specification,  relative  to  the   10 
observations included. To obtain a reasonable discriminative power and meaningful estimation results, 
an appropriate ratio of variables and observations is necessary. We address this issue by restricting 
ourselves to a single input and the most relevant outputs, i.e. the mandatory tasks. 
 
3.2  Outlier Detection 
Furthermore, DEA frontiers are sensitive to extreme values and outliers (Simar, 2003). Extreme values 
and outliers can indicate either data errors, for which DEA cannot correct, or indicate observations that 
are outside the normal range but nevertheless valid. Because DEA relies on envelopment, extreme 
values and outliers belong to the attainable set with certainty. Thus, when identified as peers, they can 
directly influence the efficiency measures of other observations. To overcome this issue, we use two 
methodologies, first the super-efficiency analysis proposed by Banker and Gifford (1988) to detect 
outliers and then the efficiency stepladder (ESL) proposed by Edvardsen (2004) to test the frontier’s 
robustness.  The  concept  of  super-efficiency  constructs  efficiency  measures  by  avoiding  that  the 
evaluated unit can help span the frontier (Bogetoft and Otto, 2011). Consequently, super-efficient 
observations obtain efficiency scores larger than unity and can be subject to an individual inspection. 
We use the results of this analysis to identify observations with a super-efficiency score
12 greater than 
1.2.  These  are  further  investigated  using  the  ESL  approach  that  indicates  the  sensitivity  of  the 
individual efficiency scores to measurement errors (Edvardsen, 2004). Thus, efficiency estimates can 
be investigated in terms of robustness. For every observation, the first step of this iterative approach is 
to identify its most influential peer, i.e. the peer whose exclusion leads to the greatest efficiency 
increase.  The  detected  peer  is  removed  and  DEA  is  conducted  again.  This  procedure  is  done 
repeatedly until the given observation becomes fully efficient. The changes of the measured efficiency 
occurring in these steps indicate the sensitivity of the measured efficiency scores against the other 
observations  in  the  data  set. This  allows  us to evaluate  the  influence  of the elimination  of  those 
observations that are found to be potentially super-efficient. 
 
3.3  Bootstrapped Truncated Second-Stage Regression 
To investigate which and whether exogenous variables have explanatory power on inefficiency, we 
conduct the bootstrapped truncated regression proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). This approach 
allows for valid inference in the second stage and is therefore superior to others. Previous studies on 
local government efficiency predominantly used OLS or Tobit regression. Tobit regression takes the 
censored nature of efficiency estimates into account (not larger than 1). However, Simar and Wilson 
(2007) note that due to serial correlation, Tobit regression yield inappropriate and biased estimation 
results. Basically, two sources of errors cause biases: on the one hand, the observations are empirically 
                                                 
12 Based on Monte Carlo simulation, Banker and Chang (2006) propose to define observations as outliers that exceed an 
efficiency level of 1.2.   11 
obtained and not independently distributed, but underlie serial correlation. On the other hand, since 
only a sample is used and the most efficient observations are not captured, the efficiency scores are 
likely  to  be  biased  upwards.  Even  though  our  sample  covers  the  whole  population  of  French 
départements, the true frontier remains unknown. Furthermore, inefficiencies may still exist for the 
efficient observations. 
To evaluate the influence of exogenous factors on the spending efficiency of French départements, we 
investigate the following relationship 
 
i i i Z q a b e = + + ,  (4) 
 
with  i q  representing the unknown true efficiency of the i-th observation, a  being a constant term 
(intercept) and  b  being the vector of coefficients to be estimated. For each variable,  b  is the same 
for all observations and indicates the relationship between  i Z , a vector of exogenous factors, to the 
efficiency score.  ei  is the statistical noise term of the i-th observation, which is restricted by the 
condition 1 i i Z e a b £ - - .  Following  Simar  and  Wilson  (2007)  this  term  is  assumed  to  follow  a 
truncated normal distribution with zero mean (before truncation), unknown variance and a truncation 
point  determined  by  this condition.  Since  the true  q   is  unknown,  it  is  replaced  with  the  Farrell 
efficiency scores obtained in the first stage (  
i q , bounded between zero and unity). The econometrical 
problem becomes 
 
  2 ~ (0, ) i i i Z with N q a b e e s = + +   (5) 
 
such that 1 i i Z e a b £ - - , which has to be solved by Maximum-Likelihood-Estimation with respect to 
b  and s . By using bootstrapping methods with b  replications, b  estimates for these coefficients are 
calculated. Confidence intervals for those estimators can be constructed following Simar and Wilson 
(2000). A positive sign of the second-stage estimation coefficient indicates a positive relationship 
between spending efficiency and the respective explanatory variable.    12 
4  Model Specification and Data 
4.1  Specification of Inputs and Outputs 
We consider the French départements as units that contribute expenditures (input) in order to provide 
a certain bundle of publicly provided services (outputs) without assuming a functional form of this 
process. 
We use total expenditures (TOTEX) as a single input employed by the départements to provide public 
services for that they are in charge of. Using TOTEX as input measure, on the one hand, allows 
incorporating all relevant input information. On the other hand, it implicitly assumes that input factor 
prices are the same for all départements. This assumption appears to be reasonable in the case of 
France: With respect to labor it is justified since wages of civil servants are mainly regulated by the 
government. With respect to capital expenditures, De Borger and Kerstens (1996) argue that Belgian 
local governments have access to the same capital markets and thus face similar capital related inputs 
prices, which can also be assumed for the French départements. A further issue related to capital input 
is  the  issue  of  the  dynamic  character  of  investments.  However,  our  data  show  that  investment 
expenditures remain fairly steady over time. 
To specify the outputs, we follow the work done by Vanden Eeckhaut et al. (1993) and De Borger et 
al. (1994) and concentrate on the départements’ legal obligations (mandatory tasks) in the fields of 
social services (care for elderly and provision of minimum subsistence grants), secondary education, 
road  construction  and  maintenance  and  general  administration.  Although,  these  outputs  do  not 
comprise the entire array of services provided, the restriction is rational. The selected outputs cover the 
most relevant competencies of the French départements, both, in terms of responsibility and in terms 
of the share in expenditures. Furthermore, it prevents us from having a poor ratio of variables to 
observations, which would deteriorate the meaning of our estimation results. We further refer to the 
one input, five output case as Model 1. 
In order to further improve the dimensionality of our model specification we define a second model 
specification (further referred to M2) where we apply the output aggregation approach proposed by 
Afonso and Fernandes (2008). The output-indicator, i.e. the local government output indicator (LGOI) 
combines the specified output variables into one measure and is constructed for each département 
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where  m  denotes the  m -th output  ( 1,..., ) m M =  and 
m
OUTPUT  denotes the average value of 
output  m . Before aggregating the output variables with equal weight, they are normalized to one.   13 
Hence, the output measure LGOI, by construction, has a mean of 1 with higher values indicating more 
output. Besides reducing the dimensions, the LGOI offers another advantage: observations are not 
necessarily  considered  as  relatively  efficient  by  performing  well  in  only  one  dimension.
13  The 
aggregation hopes to capture the overall performance. However, the equal weighting of all outputs 
may constitute a drawback and is worth discussing. Nevertheless, an alternative weighting scheme 
does not seem to be applicable nor improving, and weighting with cost shares is not possible due to 
data limitations. 
 
4.2  Specification of Exogenous Variables 
In  the  second  stage,  we  aim  to  identify  the  impact  of  some  selected  exogenous  variables  on the 
spending efficiency. For this purpose a set of variables is regressed on the efficiency scores obtained 
from the DEA analysis in the first stage. The literature provides a wide range of possible variables. 
However,  their  exogeneity  is neither  always  absolutely  certain  nor applicable  in  our context.  For 
example, the dependence on grants as a fiscal variable influences the transformation process of the 
départements itself and thus, would introduce endogeneity to the estimation. As a result the obtained 
coefficients would be biased. Hence, political or fiscal variables are omitted in this analysis. We 
choose three geographical and two socio-economic factors that are assumed to have some impact on 
the spending efficiency of the French départements. 
First, we test how efficiency is influenced by the département size (SIZE). The territorial size of the 
départements is predetermined and we hypothesize that larger départements face disadvantages due to 
the lack of positive agglomeration economies. The effort devoted to general coordination may be 
higher and provision of certain services (e.g. safety and fire fighters) might be relatively more costly. 
Thus, size may affect spending efficiency. 
Second, we test the influence of the distance to Paris (DISTANCE). In the French context this variable 
is of particular interest, since it captures the peripheral character associated with centralized states. 
Being  spatially  closer  to  the  economic  and  political  capital  seems  to  be  advantageously  to  local 
governments. The départements further from Paris, for example, may experience greater migration of 
highly skilled workers and may have limitations in exercising political influence. We therefore expect 
a negative relationship between DISTANCE and spending efficiency. 
Third, we test a variable that contains information on the coastal location (SEASIDE). Due to special 
circumstances, the départements could be forced to have additional expenditures, e.g. for flood control 
or road and port construction and maintenance. Thus, costal regions should have spending efficiency 
negatively affected. 
Fourth,  following  De  Borger  and  Kerstens  (1996)  we  include  the  households’  income 
(MED_INCOME) to the set of explanatory variables. The authors argue that the households’ income 
                                                 
13Due to the linear programming algorithm, specialists in one dimension are considered as efficient independently from their 
performance in other dimensions.   14 
may  influence  the  efficiency  in  two  ways.  First,  local  governments’  higher  fiscal  capacity  may 
facilitate  featherbedding  and  on-the-job-leisure.  This  is  not  necessarily  the  case  for  the  French 
départements, since their tax revenues are mainly independent from income levels. Nevertheless, a 
negative relationship between income and monitoring of the government by the society may exist: due 
to  higher  opportunity  costs  households  decide  to  spend  less  of  their  time  on  monitoring  their 
government,  which  facilitates  inefficiencies.  Moreover,  as  Geys  et  al.  (2010)  argue  that,  income 
possibly influences the preferences of the inhabitants. Due to additional income, the demand for public 
goods of higher quality might increase.
14 Based on these arguments, we expect a negative relationship 
between median income and efficiency. 
Lastly, we investigate what effect the population composition, especially the old-age dependency ratio 
(SHARE_ELDERLY), has. The structure of the population can significantly influence public sector 
efficiency and budgets as shown for example by Geys et al. (2007) and Seitz (2008). Even though the 
French population is expected to grow, ageing will significantly change the structure leading to a 
higher share of dependent elderly persons relative to total population, which will also lead to a change 
in the demand for public goods and services. Nevertheless, this demographic change is already present 
and leads to demand for additional public services for elderly, whereas at the moment especially rural 
counties are affected. 
 
4.3  Data 
Our sample consists of the 96 French départements exclusively located in Europe. For 2008 we gather 
monetary and physical data from the Institute for Research and Information in Health Economics 
(IRDES),  the  French  Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  the  French  National  Institute  of  Statistics  and 
Economic Studies (INSEE). Table 2 presents the main characteristics of our data. We restrict our 
analysis to 2008, since the départements obligations were extended considerably in the previous years: 
In 2004 and 2005, responsibilities in the social sector, concerning especially social welfare, care for 
elderly, as well as youth work, were extended. Similarly, in 2006 competences for the care of disabled 
were extended and responsibility for more than 17,000 km of roads was transferred from national to 
local governments. Finally, in 2007, the technical staff in secondary schools, in total more than 95,000 
employees, was transferred to the local government. However, our output variables are not able to 
capture the additional competencies assigned to the départements during this decentralization process. 
Hence, the changes in technology, i.e. the additional responsibilities, prevent us from pooling data for 
more years. For the same reason, results from comparing the year considered to previous ones, give 
only very limited information on the dynamics of spending efficiency. 
                                                 
14 Loikkanen et al. (2011) point out that resident income might also be an indicator of regional input price differentials. They 
argue that capital cost and especially land prices will be higher in areas with higher income.   15 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Inputs, Outputs and Exogenous Factors 
Variable  Unit Mean Min Max SD
Input 
TOTEX  Million Euros 653.83 118.20 2,648.28 483.87
Outputs 
POP  No. of inhabitants 654,345 80,965 2,607,476 492,756
BENEF  No. of beneficiaries 10,471 727 71,813 12,003
NURSING  No. of beds  4,799 383 12,694 2,680
PUBPUPILS  No. of pupils 24,576 0 92,604 19,176
ROAD  Kilometers 3,931 0 7,762 1,540
LGOI  Indicator 1.00 0.20 3.68 0.60
           
Explanatory Variables         
DISTANCE  Kilometers 354 0 917 204
SIZE  Square kilometer 5,666 105 10,000 1,923
SEASIDE  Dummy 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.45
MED_INCOME  Euros 26,555 20,944 39,671 3,216
SHARE_ELDERLY  Ratio 0.18 0.11 0.37 0.04
 
Input is measured as total expenditure (TOTEX), which contains all operating expenditures, including 
personnel  expenditures,  interest  payments,  general  expenditures  and  other  expenditures,  and  all 
investment expenditures, including investment costs, debt amortization, and granted subsidies. The 
départements’  outputs  are  represented  by  five  output  indicators:  the  number  of  beneficiaries  of 
minimal subsistence grants (BENEF) and the number of beds in private and public retirement and 
nursing  homes  (NURSING)
15  are  used  to  measure  social  services.  The  road  network  kilometer 
(ROAD) are used as an indicator for efforts undertaken concerning road construction and maintenance 
and  the  number  of  pupils  on  public  schools  (PUBPUPILS)
16  approximates  education  services 
provided. Finally, the total population (POP) is used as an indicator for general administrative services 
and other services. 
The départements in our sample spent on average 654 million euro, with a minimum of 118 million 
and a maximum of 2.6 billion euro. This spread indicates the large variety between the government in 
terms of size and services provided. This is also reflected by the different output measures, which vary 
strongly. Subsequently, the local government output indicator signalizes significant output differences 
and spreads from 0.2 to 3.68. The zeros for education and road-related outputs concern Paris and the 
départements of Corsica, which have transferred the responsibilities to other institutions. Since these 
expenditures do not show up in the TOTEX measure, we set the corresponding output to zero. The 
indicators also represent other obligations, for instance is the variable PUBPUPILS also an indicator 
for other youth-related services. Likewise, POP is assumed to be an indicator for the services directed 
                                                 
15Contrary to the pure number of elderly, e.g. the population over 65, this variable contains more information on the number 
of dependent elderly. 
16 This variable is chosen to measure the services regarding the provision of education infrastructure. In our opinion, this is a 
more appropriate measure then the number of schools, since it also takes different school sizes into account.   16 
to handicapped inhabitants, services for public safety and services concerning preventive medicine. 
TOTEX as input and the five output variables build our first model specification, further referred as 
Model  1.  Because  a  better  rate  of  dimensions  to  the  number  of  observations  would  improve  the 
efficiency estimation (cp. Simar and Wilson, 2008), our second model specification (further referred 
as M2) uses a Local Government Output Indicator as specified above. 
Concerning  out  exogenous  factors  the  following  variables  are  chosen:  distance  to  the  capital 
(DISTANCE)  is  measured  as  linear  distance  between  Paris  and  the  capital  of  the  considered 
département. The size of each département (SIZE) is measured as territory in square kilometers and 
ranges  from  105  to  10,000  km²  indicating  the  substantial  differences  between  the  jurisdictions 
concerning the service area. Coastal location is represented by a dummy, SEASIDE that equals one if 
the  département  has  seashore.  For  26  out  of  96  départements  in  our  sample  this  is  the  case. 
Inhabitants’ income is measured as median household income in 2008 (MED_INCOME) and its wide 
spread (between about 21,000 and 40,000 €) shows that notable economic differences between the 
territorial units exist. Finally, the old-age dependency ratio (SHARE_ELDERLY) is the share of over 
65 years old in the total population. This variable ranges from 11 to 37 percent and indicates that 
population composition varies significantly across départements. 
 
 
5  Results 
5.1  Identifying Outliers and Extreme Values 
In order to obtain meaningful and robust efficiency estimates using DEA, we screen the data for 
outliers and extreme values. The histograms in Figure 1 show the frequency distribution of efficiency 
measures  from  super-efficiency  analysis.  Using  model  specification  M1  (left  graph),  three 
observations, Lozère, Loire-Atlantique, and Yvelines, have efficiency scores that exceed the critical 
value of 1.2 proposed by Banker and Chang (2006). Thus, they are candidates to be excluded from the 
sample. Using model specification M2 only one observation, Lozère, attains an efficiency score that is 
notably larger than one. We assume that these results are not driven by data errors
17, and review the 
observations with respect to their characteristics. Lozère attains super-efficiency scores of about 1.4 
and 1.3 in model specifications M1 and M2, respectively. It is the sample’s smallest unit in terms of 
both input and output. Hence, we conclude that Lozère is an extreme, but still valid, observation 
outside the normal range. Loire-Atlantique receives a high efficiency score of about 1.6 in model 
specification M1, while it is not suspicious in M2. The same pattern is observed for Yvelines, which 
has an efficiency score slightly above 1.2 in M1, while inefficient in M2. One explanation for this 
finding could be that Loire-Atlantique and Yvelines are specialists in one of the dimensions (possibly 
                                                 
17However, one cannot rule out the possibility of measurement errors.   17 
causing the results of M1). In order to decide which observation to exclude, we further test their 
impact on other départements’ performance using ESL. 
 
Figure 1: Histograms of Super-efficiency Analysis 
M1 (I=96)  M2 (I=96) 
 
 
The conclusions, drawn from the ESL approach, are the same for both model specifications. For its 
visual representation we refer to model specification M2. The left graphic Figure 2 shows the first two 
steps of this approach, including all observations. Already the first step (ESL(1))notably increases the 
efficiency estimates of numerous observations. A closer look at the most influential peers excluded 
during  the  whole  procedure  reveals  that  among  the  super-efficient  units  Lozère’s  impact  on  the 
efficiency of the other observations is the greatest. Loire-Atlantique or Yvelines are rarely identified as 
the most influential peer. Hence, excluding Lozère leads to a strong increase of efficiency estimates 
for certain observations, while excluding Loire-Atlantique or Yvelines would have nearly no impact. 
Therefore, we first exclude Lozère and recalculated the super-efficiency scores and the ESL with the 
remaining 95 observations. 
The recalculated super-efficiency analysis finds no new super-efficient observations indicating that 
Lozère has not masked any other outlier. Again, Loire-Atlantique and Yvelines are identified to be 
super-efficient in model specification M1 (about 1.6 and 1.2, respectively) and not in M2 (both about 
0.9). The new ESL for M2 is shown in the right graphic of Figure 2. After excluding Lozère, the 
frontier is clearly less prone to outliers and appears to be robust against extreme data points. For the 
sample of the remaining 95 observations the first step increases the mean efficiency by less than 4 %. 
Note that these findings also apply for M1 in which Loire-Atlantique and Yvelines would be identified 
as additional outliers in the super-efficiency analysis. Nevertheless, since their impact on the frontier - 
and thus on the efficiency scores of the other observations - is found to be limited, we do not exclude 
additional observations and further analysis is conducted for the sample of 95 départements.   18 
Figure 2: Efficiency Step Ladder for M2 Before and After Excluding Lozère 
M2 (I=96)  M2 (I=95) 
 
 
5.2  Spending Efficiency Measurement 
The DEA estimation results for the 95 observations are summarized in Table 3. The mean spending 
efficiency  of  French  départements  is  about  90  %  in  model  specification  M1  and  78  %  in  M2, 
respectively. This implies an average improvement potential of 10 % and 22 % meaning that the 
départements could save this amount of inputs while providing the observed level of output. In both 
models, the maximum value of spending efficiency is 1 by definition, while minimum values differ. 
The lowest efficiency score attained in M1 is 65 % and 46 % in M2. This finding is related to the 
lower dimensionality of model M2. Further, the lower dimensionality is the main reason why model 
M2 finds considerably fewer observations as fully efficient than model M1 does. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Spending Efficiency Estimates (in %) for M1 and M2 
Model Specification  Mean Median Min  Max SD Efficient unit 
M1  0.897 0.896 0.653  1 0.093 28 
M2  0.782 0.773 0.458  1 0.124 6 
Note: The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for M1 and M2 is 81 %. 
 
However, a Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 81 % indicates that the départements are judged 
similarly  in  terms  of  relative  order.
18  A  more  detailed  evaluation  reveals  that  the  observations 
considered as efficient in M2 are also found to be efficient in M1. Furthermore, they are mainly 
located in the North of France. Similarly, the départements with lower rankings are the same in both 
models and predominantly located in the South East of France. 
                                                 
18A high coefficient of the Spearman rank correlation allows to draw similar conclusion from the estimation although the 
magnitude of efficiency differs, see e.g., Hirschhausen et al. (2006).   19 
Table  4  summarizes  the  spending  efficiency  scores  of  the  départements  grouped  by  regions  and 
underlines the finding of existing regional differences. Two Northern regions host the most efficient 
départements,  namely  Nord-Pas-De-Calais,  a  densely  populated  region,  and  Basse-Normandie,  a 
relatively sparsely populated one. In both regions, the départements are situated close to the frontier. 
Both Rhône-Alpes, which contains the second largest industrial cluster in Frances, and Corse, are 
located in southeastern France and contain poorly performing départements. For both regions, the 
analysis suggests that the current level of output could be achieved with 20 % less actual input. In 
general, the efficiency scores possess a slightly negative correlation with economic strength (in terms 
of per capita GDP). However, this might not only be caused by wasting resources but - to certain 
extent - also relates to higher quality public goods and services. Unfortunately, quality cannot be 
reflected by the data available.
19 
 
Table 4: Spending Efficiency of the Départements Grouped by Regions 
M1  M2 
Région 
a 
No. of  
départ.
b  Mean  Med.  Min  Max  Mean  Med.  Min  Max 
Alsace  2  0.82  0.82  0.78  0.86  0.73  0.73  0.64  0.81 
Aquitaine  5  0.87  0.84  0.78  1.00  0.78  0.75  0.68  1.00 
Auvergne  4  0.93  0.94  0.85  1.00  0.85  0.82  0.79  0.97 
Bourgogne  4  0.89  0.91  0.76  1.00  0.81  0.82  0.67  0.93 
Bretagne  4  0.86  0.86  0.77  0.94  0.71  0.71  0.64  0.77 
Centre  6  0.94  0.92  0.90  1.00  0.85  0.78  0.76  1.00 
Champagne-Ardenne  4  0.97  0.99  0.90  1.00  0.82  0.87  0.63  0.90 
Corse  2  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.79  0.72  0.72  0.70  0.74 
Franche-Comté  4  0.87  0.84  0.78  1.00  0.74  0.67  0.62  1.00 
Île-de-France  8  0.90  1.00  0.69  1.00  0.74  0.76  0.56  0.91 
Languedoc-Roussillon  4  0.97  1.00  0.87  1.00  0.78  0.78  0.75  0.84 
Limousin  3  0.87  0.89  0.71  1.00  0.80  0.77  0.65  1.00 
Lorraine  4  0.92  0.93  0.84  1.00  0.80  0.76  0.72  0.96 
Midi-Pyrénées  8  0.87  0.86  0.80  1.00  0.75  0.76  0.61  0.90 
Nord-Pas-De-Calais  2  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Basse-Normandie  3  0.98  1.00  0.95  1.00  0.94  0.95  0.90  0.97 
Haute-Normandie  2  0.89  0.89  0.79  0.99  0.81  0.81  0.77  0.85 
Pays de la Loire  6  0.93  0.98  0.78  1.00  0.79  0.76  0.58  0.95 
Picardie  2  0.87  0.87  0.87  0.88  0.82  0.80  0.76  0.89 
Poitou-Charentes  4  0.95  0.96  0.88  1.00  0.86  0.85  0.81  0.93 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur  6  0.86  0.85  0.74  1.00  0.76  0.75  0.61  0.96 
Rhône-Alpes  8  0.81  0.82  0.65  0.99  0.66  0.68  0.46  0.86 
a) The régions are the French NUTS-2 level
 b) The number of départements is their number on the territory of a 
régions. Régions borders are also département borders; no département belongs to more than one region. 
 
Regarding  the  different  model  specifications,  the  results  emphasize  the  sensitivity  of  efficiency 
measures on output aggregation. For example the average département of the region Île-de-France, the 
                                                 
19 Quality aspects are rarely covered in the literature. Examples can be found in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2002, 2007).   20 
political and economic center of France, which includes Paris, is close to the overall mean efficiency 
in model M1 and achieves a score of about 0.9. In model M2 these départements fall behind and reach 
only an average efficiency of 0.74. This can mainly be explained by the definition of LGOI, the 
compound output indicator. The densely populated départements in that region reach high values in 
population-related output measures, but lower scores in the other fields. The resulting low scores in 
few output indicators results in a lower overall LGOI. 
Although LGOI offers certain advantages, particularly with respect to the dimensionality, the imposed 
equal weighting of different government activities remains hard to defend while DEA determines these 
weights  endogenously.  Nevertheless,  results  from  LGOI  are  comparable  to  those  obtained  with 
separate  outputs.  Therefore,  the  second-stage  analysis  relies  only  on  the  multiple  output  model 
specification of model M1. 
 
5.3  Explaining Efficiency 
In order to explain parts of the performance of the French départements, we conduct in a second stage 
a bootstrapped truncated regression following Simar and Wilson (2007). A set of exogenous factors is 
regressed on the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA program. Furthermore, due to the truncation 
at unity, the number of observations giving information about this relationship reduces from 95 to 67. 
The estimation results of the second-stage regression are summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5: Second-Stage Regression Results 
    b     p-value    CI LB
c  CI UB
d
 
SIZE  0.0162    0.161    -0.0065  0.0389 
DISTANCE  -0.2790  **  0.048    -0.0555  -0.0003 
SEASIDE  0.0090    0.732    -0.0427  0.0607 
MED_INCOME  -0.0190  ***  0.002    -0.0307  -0.0072 
SHARE_ELDERLY  -1.3247  **  0.020    -2.4385  -0.2108 
Constant  1.6082  ***  0.000    1.1160  2.1004 
             
Sigma  0.0708  ***  0    0.0548  0.0868 
Log-likelihood  90.14           
n  67           
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 %, at 10 % level. 
c) Lower bound of the confidence interval, 
d) upper bound. For better representation, data is corrected for the standard deviation. 
 
For the variables SIZE and SEASIDE we find no significant impact on the French départements’ 
spending  efficiency.  Concerning  the  first,  modern  communication  technology  possibly  simplifies 
coordination and thus, reduces transaction costs. Concerning the latter, the effect of coastal location 
seems to be negligible when analyzing public sector efficiency for French départements. 
                                                 
20 Note that regression results may vary when bootstrapping is applied. Nevertheless, our results show up to be robust.   21 
Concerning the variable DISTANCE, we find a significant negative impact on the spending efficiency, 
meaning being located closer to Paris fosters performance.
21 This is in line with previous analyses on 
other European unitary states, such as Portugal (Afonso and Fernandes, 2008) and Finland (Loikkanen 
and Susiluoto, 2006, Loikkanen et al., 2011). Distance to policymakers might influence efficiency in 
several ways: first, remote départements might face migration of highly skilled workers to the capital. 
This is possibly even more relevant for France because of the exceptional economical and political 
position  of  Paris.  The  capital  attracts  an  especially  young  and  highly  skilled  population  (French 
Census,  2006),  which  also  improves  the  pool  of  candidates  for  the  public  sector.  Moreover,  this 
finding might be interpreted as the ability of local governments to exercise direct influence on national 
politics to their advantage. Since Paris hosts the major political institutions on national, regional and 
departmental  level,  closeness  to  the  political  decision-makers  can  be  beneficial,  e.g.  when  the 
redistribution of sub-national tasks during the process of decentralization are discussed. Regarding this 
point, further analysis of the influence of political variables would be beneficial as far as they can be 
represented by exogenous measures. 
Similar to other studies, like De Borger and Kerstens (1996), our results show a significant negative 
relationship with spending efficiency and median income (MED_INCOME). As previously noted, 
there  are  two  explanations  for  this  finding:  on  the  one  hand,  high-income  households  probably 
sacrifice  less time  monitoring  their  government  due  to  higher  opportunity  costs,  which  facilitates 
inefficiency. On the other hand, demand for public goods of higher quality might increase in high 
income  areas,  driving  up  the  costs  for  the  local  government.  As  long  as  no  quality  indicator  is 
available, this question remains unanswered. 
The coefficient of the share of elderly population (SHARE_ELDERLY) has a negative sign and is 
highly significant. Thus, demographic structure seems to impact spending efficiency. An explanation 
for this could be that costs of service provision are higher for the elderly segments of the population, 
as shown by Seitz (2008) for Germany. Since population projections for France forecast a significant 
increase  in  the  elderly  population,  local  government  budgets  will  be  especially  affected  at  the 
département level due to the allocation of responsibilities among the layers of government. In light of 
this demographic challenge, analyzing and reducing public sector inefficiency becomes even more 
important.
22 
Overall, our results suggest that efficiency is partly driven by exogenous factors. Peripheral location 
and greater resident income are negatively related to efficiency. Likewise, a higher share of elderly 
population  is  found  to  negatively  influence  efficiency.  Contrarily,  départements’  size  and  coastal 
location  are  not  found  to  have  significant  influence.  Future  research  on  governments’  efficiency 
should take this into account to derive more accurate efficiency estimates. 
                                                 
21 We also test a variable that contains information on the topography, i.e. the highest elevation in the départements. Such a 
variable is highly correlated  with DISTANCE.  Therefore, our estimator  might also include effects of the land-form on 
efficiency. 
22A higher share of elderly population is also related to a rural structure of a département. Therefore our estimator might also 
include negative effects from this factor, e.g. by allowing for agglomeration and scale economies.   22 
6  Conclusion 
The French government has reallocated responsibilities for service deliveries in the first years of the 
2000s. These changes increased the responsibilities of the French départements, structural reforms, 
such as this decentralization process, are considered as important means of fiscal consolidation that 
appear to be necessary in order to overcome the increasing pressure on public budgets. Furthermore, 
the restructuring aims to help improving the public sector’s productivity and efficiency. 
To identify the efficiency of public spending and potential improvements, we use Data Envelopment 
Analysis,  a  nonparametric  deterministic  approach  of  efficiency  analysis,  to  a  sample  of  the  96 
départements in metropolitan France in 2008. This approach is particularly suitable since the behavior 
of public sectors might not be adequately represented by production or cost functions relying on 
microeconomic assumptions. We define total expenditures as the single input administrative units 
employ. For the representation of the responsibilities, we focus on the obligatory tasks. Hence, the best 
practice displays the minimal amount of expenditures required to provide the given level of obligatory 
tasks provided. Similar to analyses on the spending efficiency at municipal (Loikkanen and Susiluoto, 
2006) and national levels (Afonso et al., 2005), we find significant inefficiencies in public service 
provision at the intermediate level of government. More precisely, we identify an average spending 
efficiency of the French départements of about 78 to 90 %, depending on the model specification. 
Hence, the expenditures could be reduced by 10 to 22 %, while providing the same amount of public 
services. The range of efficiency varies significantly among the départements, which is in line with 
previous analysis on local governments (e.g. Afonso and Fernandes, 2008). Based on our results, the 
départements in the northern regions can serve as reference points to identify possible improvements 
since  they  perform  better  compared  to  other  regions.  However,  our  results  also  indicate  that 
inefficiency is not only due to inefficient usage of resources.  
In fact, exogenous factors can contribute to inefficiency and, thus, must be taken into account when 
evaluating the potential improvement. We are interested in identifying those factors that impact the 
départements’ performance but are not under their control. For this purpose we conduct a bootstrapped 
truncated regression as proposed by Simar and Wilson (2007). Our results suggest that the population 
structure,  the  households’  median  income  and  distance  to  Paris  negatively  affect  the  spending 
efficiency.  
Concluding,  our  analysis  shows  that  the  efficiency  of  French  sub-national  governments  could  be 
increased, and hence, improve the fiscal position. Against the background of the increasing importance 
of sub-national tiers, this is particularly relevant for the public provision of goods and services and for 
the public budget from a global perspective. In 2008 France established a committee for the reform of 
territorial  collectivities  (Comité  pour  la  réforme  des  collectivités  locales)  with  the  objective  of 
reviewing the territorial organization and local administration. Following the arguments by OECD 
(2003), this process should address the allocation of responsibilities and implementation of proper   23 
control mechanisms. Efficiency analysis could contribute to this discussion being a useful tool not 
only for the performance evaluation, but also for assessing the consolidation of budgets and territories. 
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